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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
tempt of court cannot be said to be the equivalent of the carefully safe-
guarded statutory proceeding of the board, which the court proceeding is
intended to follow.' s
Originally the board itself recognized that a blanket order was not a
general necessity;2 but subsequently, however, it changed its interpretation
of the statute-o and "consistently held that a violation by an employer of
any of the four subdivisions of sec. 8 other than subdivision (1) is also a
violation of subdivision (1)," without stating its reasons for this change
in policy. The early interpretation of the board would probably be in line
with the holding of the majority opinion: broad orders are not excluded
by the Supreme Court. What is condemned is the practice of issuing such
orders merely because the board has found a single violation of the act.
Such orders may still be lawful, but only when there is a relation between
the findings of the board and the other practices enjoined, and when the
circumstances of the particular case require it.
In an appraisal of this decision, it seems proper to note that the court 2'
is more likely to uphold a broad cease and desist order based upon a viola-
tion of the subdivisions of sec 8 other than subdivision (5), since they
have a more direct relation to right of self-organization granted to em-
ployees by sec. 7 of the act22 and protected by the other provisions of sec. 8.
P.R.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - CIVIL LIBERTIES - INTERSTATE PASSENGERS-
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-[United States].-Plaintiff, a colored man, pur-
chased first class railroad accommodations from Chicago, Illinois to Hot
Springs, Arkansas. In Memphis, Tennessee he transferred to a sleeper.
Shortly after entering Arkansas, the conductor, in accordance with railroad
custom and an Arkansas statute requiring "equal but separate and sufficient
accommodations,"' compelled him under threat of arrest to move to the in,
orders, stressing their convenience and arguing that the board's sanctions
are insufficient to effectuate the policy of the act. It may perhaps be re-
marked that this end would require more than any possible cease and desist
order could accomplish. The suggested means are therefore inadequate to
achieve the end sought.
18. Administrative process may be extremely careful, rather than sum-
mary, and may even become more cumbersome than a court's proceeding.
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report
(1941) 89.
19. 1 National Labor Relations Board, Annual Report (1936) 121.
20. (1941) 8 L. R. R. 32, referring to the previous Annual Reports. Cf.
2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) sees. 281 and
360, and Lien, Labor Law and Relations (1938) sec. 136.
21. Cf. N. L. R. R. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co. (1937) 301
U. S. 58; Consolidated Edison Co. v. N4 L. R. B. (1938) 305 U. S. 197.
22. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." National Labor
Relations Act (1935) 49 Stat. 449, sec. 7, 29 U. S. C. A. (supp. 1940) sec.
157.
1. Ark. Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas (Pope. 1937) sec. 1190.
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ferior car provided for colored passengers. 2 Plaintiff filed a complaint with
the Interstate Commerce Commission alleging unjust discrimination against
colored passengers in violation of Sec. 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce
Act 3 and the Fourteenth Amendment and asking that the Commission re-
quire the defendants to cease and desist from the alleged violations and to
furnish equal accommodations to colored passengers.4 The Commission,
finding a negligible demand for Negro first class accommodations, held that
the failure to provide equal facilities in comfort and convenience was not an
unjust or unreasonable discrimination.5 On appeal the Supreme Court held:
the comparative volume of traffic did not justify the denial of equality of
treatment which is specifically safeguarded by the Interstate Commerce
Act.6 The court further found that the right of equality guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment7 was invaded. Mitchell v. United States.8
Broad federal prohibition of racial discrimination was attempted in the
2. Id. at sec. 1196.
3. (1920) 41 Stat. 479, c. 91, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 3 (1).
4. Prior to the Commission's order the railroad installed a separate coach
for colored passengers equal to second class white facilities, but the only
provision made for first class Negro passengers was separate compartment
drawing rooms.
5. Mitchell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. (1938) 229 I. C. C. 703.
6. (1920) 41 Stat. 479, c. 91, 49 U. S. C. A. sec. 3 (1) provides that it
shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the act "to subject any
particular person * * * to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage in any respect whatsoever." Congress in the orginal enactment of
this clause (1887) 24 Stat. 380, c. 104, adopted the language of the English
Railway and Canal Traffic Act (1854) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 31, s. 2, and it has
been held that the English construction was meant to be adopted. I. C. C. v.
Baltimore & 0. R. R. (1892) 145 U. S. 263, 284. The English statute was
directed against discrimination as to rates. 4 Halsbury, The Laws of Eng-
land, 74-82. The Court in the instant case, Mitchell v. U. S. (1941) 61 S. Ct.
873, 877 stated: "From the inception of its administration the Interstate
Commerce Commission has recognized the applicability of this provision to
discrimination against colored passengers because of their race * * *." This
has been sustained by prior cases. See cases cited infra note 25.
7. Although the court relied heavily on the Interstate Commerce Act, it
was also held that inequality of treatment is "an invasion of a fundamental
individual right which is guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment * * *." (Italics supplied.) Mitchell v. U. S. (1941) 61 S. Ct.
873, 877. The question might be raised as to the existence of "state action"
in the instant case. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
only to discriminatory state laws and discriminatory action by state officials.
Civil Rights Cases (1883) 109 U. S. 3. State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada
(1938) 305 U. S. 337, which was cited by the court, may be sustained on
this ground. The only applicable case cited for the holding was McCabe v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914) 235 U. S. 151. There the court states,
1. c. 161-162: "It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of
the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting * * * under the
authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his jour-
ney which * * * is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain
that his constitutional privilege has been invaded." (Italics supplied.) This
would seem to hold the carrier to be a state official within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. This would seem to be the only justification
for the position taken by the court in the instant case.
8. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 873.
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Civil Rights Act of 1866; 9 but immediately thereafter the Southern states
enacted the "black laws of 1865-1868," which took the form of harsh re-
strictive measures.' 0 In order to make the federal Bill of Rights binding on
the states, to declare who are citizens of the United States and to re-estab-
lish the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868. The most far-reaching federal attempt to provide for the civil
rights of Negroes came in the Civil Rights Act of 1875.11 It provided for
the "full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges of public conveyances and other places of public amuse-
ment."' 2 In 1883 the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was declared unconstitutional
as to broad prohibition of segregation or discrimination because of race or
color,"2 but the cases left open the question of federal regulation of those
matters which come under the commerce clause.14 After the Civil Rights
Cases,1" the Southern states enacted the so-called "Jim Crow" or segrega-
tion statutes providing for "separate but equal" accommodations.16 On the
other hand, the Northern states enacted civil rights acts to take the place
of the federal law of 1875; 17 these laws were designed to end racial dis-
crimination of any sort in all places of public accommodation.1"
The segregation statutes have been held valid as applied to intrastate
passengers even though they affect interstate commerce, their validity being
based on state power to protect life and health under the police power.19
Earlier cases held the "Jim Crow" statutes invalid insofar as they applied
to interstate commerce 2o and the Supreme Court in Hall v. De Cuir"21 held
9. (1866) 14 Stat. 27, c. 31. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment (1908) 46-50 states: "The belief prevailed generally that the
Civil Rights Bill gave the colored people the same rights and privileges as
regards travel, schools, theaters and the ordinary rights which may be
legally demanded." (Italics supplied.)
10. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (1909) 43 Am. Law
Rev. 205.
11. (1875) 18 Stat. 336, c. 114.
12. Ibid.
13. Civil Rights Cases (1883) 109 U. S. 3, declared the act unconstitu-
tional because it did not come within the Fourteenth Amendment which
applies only to protect the individual against state action while the act
referred to action by individuals against individuals. The attempt to rest
the act on the Thirteenth Amendment as an elimination of badges of servi-
tude was refused; the court held that to validate the act on this ground
would stretch the principle too far.
14. Id. at 18.
15. Ibid.
16. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (1909) 43 Am. Law
Rev. 547, 563.
17. Note (1939) 39 Col. Law Rev. 986, 996, footnote 66.
18. For a chart showing relative scope of the civil rights acts, see
Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (1909), 43 Am. Law Rev.
547, 565.
19. Louisville, N. 0. & T. R. R. v. Mississippi (1890) 133 U. S. 587;
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kentucky (1900) 179 U. S. 388; McCabe v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1914) 235 U. S. 151; South Covington & C.
Str. R. Co. v. Kentucky (1920) 252 U. S. 399.
20. Anderson v. L. & N. R. Co. (1894) 62 Fed. 46; Hart v. State (1905)
100 Md. 595, 60 Atl. 457; State v. Jenkins (1914) 124 Md. 376, 92 AtI. 773;
19411
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a state statute prohibiting segregation void as an undue interference with
interstate commerce. Despite these holdings the more recent cases have held
the segregation statutes valid even though they affect interstate commerce
primarily.22
The cases indicate that the court will allow segregation of interstate
passengers by railroad regulation23 or by state statute,24 but will require
strict equality of comfort and convenience. 25 It might be argued that allow-
ing a requirement of segregation is an undue preference within the meaning
of the Interstate Commerce Act.26 To argue that there is no discrimination,
since neither race can use the facilities reserved for the other, is unrealistic;
it ignores the stigma attached to the Negro accommodation.2 7 The refusal
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to find for the plaintiff in the in-
stant case graphically proves segregation to be a real burden on interstate
commerce, because it entails the duplication of facilities incommensurate
Carrey v. Spencer (1895) 72 N .Y. St. Rep. 108, 36 N. Y. Supp. 886, 5
I. C. C. 636. Cf. Ohio Val. Ry's. Rec'r. v. Landre (1898) 104 Ky. 431, 47
S. W. 344. Annotation (1923) 30 A. L. R. 55.
21. (1877) 95 U. S. 485.
22. Hall v. De Cuir (1877) 95 U. S. 485 was distinguished in Louisville,
N. 0. & T. R. R. Co. v. Mississippi (1890) 133 U. S. 587 which held a
segregation law valid even though it applied to interstate as well as intra-
state passengers. This trend was carried to its extreme in South Covington
& C. Str. R. R. v. Kentucky (1920) 252 U. S. 399 in which the greater part
of the carrier's passengers were interstate. On logical grounds it is difficult
to see the distinction between the De Cuir case and the Louisville case. In
the Louisville case Justice Harlan, dissenting, 1. c. 594 stated, "In its appli-
cation * * *" the statute in the De Cuir case "forbade the separation of
the white and black races while such vessels were within the limits of that
state." The statute treated in the Louisville case "* * * in its application
to passengers on railroad trains employed in interstate commerce, requires
such separation of races, while those trains are within that State. I am
unable to perceive how the former is a regulation of interstate commerce,
and the other is not." See also Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 U. S. 537.
23. Ordinarily, in matters of interstate commerce, inaction by Congress
has been held t@ be a declaration that commerce within the scope of the
commerce clause be free from interference. Welton v. Missouri (1875) 91
U. S. 275; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago (1882) 107 U. S. 678; Gloucester Ferry
Co. v. Pennsylvania (1885) 114 U. S. 196. But it has been held that segrega-
tion by railroad regulation is permissable in the absence of the entrance of
Congress into the field. Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. (1910) 218 U. S.
71; Green v. The City of Bridgton (D. C. S. D. Ga. 1879) Fed. Case No.
5,754; The Sue (D. C. D. Md. 1885) 22 Fed. 843; The regulation must be
reasonable and of'reasonably long standing. Washington B. & A. Electric
R. R. Co. v. Waller (App. D. C. 1923) 289 Fed. 598.
24. See cases cited supra note 21.
25. Councill v. Western & A. R. R. Co. (1887) 1 I. C. C. 638; Edwards
v. Nashville C. & St. L. R. (1907) 12 I. C. C. 247; Cozart v. Southern Ry.
Co. (1909) 16 I. C. C. 226; Crosby v. St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co. (1926) 112
I. C. C. 239. The discrimination takes two forms within the meaning of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Discriminations as to the rule and discrimina-
tions as to the application of the rule are both forbidden. Dutton Lbr. Corp.
v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. (1929) 151 I. C. C. 391.
26. (1920) 41 Stat. 479, c. 91, 49 U. S. C. A sec. 3(1).
27. Note (1939) 39 Col. Law Rev. 986, 1003.
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with the demand for accommodations by the colored passengers.28 Should
the court recognize segregation to be an undue preference, the way would
seem to be clear for a federal uniform prohibition of segregation as well as
inequality in comfort and convenience. 29
H. S. H.
CONTRACTS-ARBITRATION AND AWARD-AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE Fu-
TURE DIsPuTES-[Minnesota].-A contract between plaintiff and defendant
contained a provision requiring certain questions to be submitted to arbitra-
tion according to statute, the decision of the arbitrators to be a condition
precedent to any right of legal action. There was an arbitration and an
award, but not according to the statutory procedure. Action was brought
to recover the award. The plaintiff appealed from a decision for the de-
fendants. Held: (two judges dissenting) reversed; since the arbitration
statute expressly preserved the right to common law arbitration, the pro-
ceedings actually had did not lose their validity. A contention that the
defendant had not consented to the common law proceedings was rejected
by the court which proceeded to reverse a long line of cases and to announce
that an agreement to arbitrate all differences to arise under a contract is
not contrary to public policy. The result, as the dissenting opinion points
out, is to declare all agreements to arbitrate, including those under common
law, to be irrevocable. In reaching this decision the majority stated that
public policy is what the legislature declares it to be. The legislature had
enacted an arbitration statute. This statute was taken to be the legislative
approval of the policy of arbitration, and the court proceeded to give effect
to that policy in its broadest sense. Park Construction Co. v. Independent
School District No. 82.1
The view of the court is contrary to the overwhelming weight of author-
ity in this country, which is that provisions for arbitrations of future dis-
putes are revocable. 2 "Such agreements are void-prejudicial to the rights
of citizens as guaranteed by the Constitution, to resort to the courts for the
determination of their rights;"3 being an attempt to oust the courts of their
jurisdiction, they are held to be contrary to public policy and invalid.4
28. Mitchell v. Chicago, R. I. &. P. Ry. Co. (1938) 229 I. C. C. 703.
29. By such recognition the court would in effect be holding that the
federal government has entered the field and as a consequence state laws
would not be allowed to be in conflict with the federal rule. It is to be
noted that this suggestion is predicated solely on the suggestion that the
courts recognize the inequality in segregation.
1. (Minn. 1941) 296 N. W. 475.
2. Sturges, A Treatise on Commercial Arbitrations and Awards (1930)
45. However, there is a distinction generally made between an agreement
providing for the ascertainment of facts by arbitrators, and one providing
for the determination of legal liability. The former are generally upheld.
6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1938) 5371-5373, sec. 1921.
3. Cocalis v. Nazlides (1923) 308 Ill. 152, 139 N. E. 95. "Void" as used
here apparently has the meaning which Sturges includes in the term "re-
vocable": "* * * a party to such a clause or provision can maintain an action
in court although the action is based upon a cause which is embraced in
1941]
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